

Model-Free Online Learning in Unknown Sequential Decision Making Problems and Games

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Abstract

Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) are currently the practical state of the art for computing a Nash equilibrium. Most regret-minimization algorithms for tree-form sequential decision making, including CFR, require (i) an exact *model* of the player’s decision nodes, observation nodes, and how they are linked, and (ii) full knowledge, at all times t , about the payoffs—even in parts of the decision space that are not encountered at time t . Recently, there has been growing interest towards relaxing some of those restrictions and making regret minimization applicable to settings for which reinforcement learning methods have traditionally been used—for example, those in which only black-box access to the environment is available. We give the first, to our knowledge, regret-minimization algorithm that guarantees sublinear regret with high probability even when requirement (i)—and thus also (ii)—is dropped. We formalize an online learning setting in which the strategy space is not known to the agent and gets revealed incrementally whenever the agent encounters new decision points. We give an efficient algorithm that achieves $O(T^{3/4})$ regret with high probability for that setting, even when the agent faces an adversarial environment. Our experiments show it significantly outperforms the prior algorithms for the problem, which do not have such guarantees. It can be used in any application for which regret minimization is useful: approximating Nash equilibrium or quantal response equilibrium, approximating coarse correlated equilibrium in multi-player games, learning a best response, learning safe opponent exploitation, and online play against an unknown opponent/environment.

1 Introduction

A *tree-form sequential decision making (TFSDM)* problem formalizes in a tree-form structure the interaction of an agent with an unknown and potentially adversarial environment. The agent’s tree includes decision nodes, observation nodes, and terminal nodes. TFSDM captures the problem that a player faces in an extensive-form game. TFSDM also captures MDPs and POMDPs where the agent conditions on observed history, but TFSDM problems are more general because the Markovian assumption is not necessarily made.

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In TFSDM, the environment may react adversarially to what the agent does. This is important to take into account, for example, in game-theoretic settings and *multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL)* because the other agents’ learning makes the environment nonstationary for the agent (Sandholm and Crites 1996; Matignon, Laurent, and Le Fort-Piat 2012). This is in contrast to the standard assumption in single-agent reinforcement learning where the environment is *oblivious* to the agent instead of adversarial. Hence, learning strong *policies* (aka. *strategies*) in TFSDM problems is especially challenging, and the agent must be careful about exploration because exploration actions can change the environment.

Online, regret minimization methods have been successfully used in TFSDM. In particular, the *counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)* framework decomposes the overall regret of an agent to local regrets at individual decision nodes (aka. information sets in game theory) (Zinkevich et al. 2007). That enables significantly larger TFSDMs to be tackled. Many enhancements have been developed on top of the basic CFR framework (Lanctot et al. 2009; Tammelin 2014; Brown and Sandholm 2015; Brown, Kroer, and Sandholm 2017; Brown and Sandholm 2017a, 2019a; Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2019), and have led to major milestones in imperfect-information games such as poker (Bowling et al. 2015; Moravčík et al. 2017; Brown and Sandholm 2017b, 2019b). Many of those methods *guarantee* low regret even against an adversarial environment—which, in turn, enables the computation of game-theoretic solutions such as Nash equilibrium, coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978; Celli et al. 2020), best responses, etc.

However, those methods usually come with two drawbacks: (i) they require an explicit upfront *model* of the agent’s decision space, and (ii) depending on the online learning model used, they require full feedback, at all times t , about the payoffs assigned by the environment—even in parts of the decision space not encountered at time t . There has been work towards an online learning setting, called the *bandit optimization setting*, that drops (ii) (Lattimore and Szepesvári 2020). Most MARL algorithms apply for the unknown game setting and drop both (i) and (ii), often at the cost of invalidating any regret guarantees. In this paper, we give, to our knowledge, the first regret-minimization algorithm that guarantees sublinear (specifically $O(T^{3/4} \sqrt{\log 1/p})$) with probability $1 - p$) regret even when requirements (i) and (ii) are both dropped.

Conceptually, our algorithm has elements of both online bandit optimization and MARL. On the one hand, our regret guarantees hold with high probability no matter how the environment picks its actions or assigns utilities to terminal nodes at all iterations t . In fact, our algorithm is a regret minimizer in the proper online-learning sense: it does not need to know—and makes no assumptions about—the underlying policy of the environment or the utility at the terminal states. Furthermore, those quantities are not assumed to be time independent and they can even be selected adversarially by the environment at each iteration. This is contrast with many *self-play* methods, that require control over the opponent in order to retain guarantees. In particular, because we assume no control over the adversarial environment, every interaction with the environment can lead it to react and change behavior in the next iteration. So, it is impossible to “freeze” the policy of the environment to perform off-policy exploration like many self-play methods require. Because of its strong online guarantees, our algorithm can be used for all the applications in which regret minimization provides benefits—for example, to converge to Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum extensive-form game, to learn a best response against static opponents, to converge to coarse correlated equilibrium in a multiagent setting (Moulin and Vial 1978; Celli et al. 2020), to converge to a quantal-response equilibrium (Ling, Fang, and Kolter 2018; Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2019), to compute safe exploitative strategies (Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2019; Ponsen, De Jong, and Lanctot 2011), or to play online against an unknown opponent/environment.

On the other hand, ours is *not* an algorithm for the online bandit optimization problem. In bandit optimization, the agent does *not* interact with the environment: at all times t , the agent outputs a policy π^t for the whole decision space, and receives a single real number u^t , representing the gain incurred by π^t , as feedback. Instead, our algorithm operates within a slightly different online learning model that we introduce, which we call the *interactive bandit model*. In it, the decision maker gets to observe the signals (actions) selected by the environment on the path from the root of the decision problem to the agent’s terminal state, in additions to u^t . Hence, we operate within a more specific online learning model than bandit optimization (which applies to, for example, picking a point on a sphere also, as opposed to just TFSDM), and rather one that is natural to TFSDM. This comes with a significant advantage. While, to our knowledge, all algorithms for the bandit optimization problem require *a priori* knowledge of the full structure of the tree-from sequential decision problem,¹ our algorithm for the interactive bandits model is *model free*. Here, the structure of the tree-form sequential decision process is at first unknown and has to be discovered by exploring as part of the decision-making process. Decision and observation nodes are revealed only at the time the agent encounters them for the first time.

¹This is needed, for example, to construct a self-concordant barrier function (Abernethy, Hazan, and Rakhlin 2008) or a global regularizer for the strategy space (Abernethy and Rakhlin 2009; Farina, Schmucker, and Sandholm 2021), to compute a barycentric spanner (Awerbuch and Kleinberg 2004; Bartlett et al. 2008), or to set up a kernel function (Bubeck, Lee, and Eldan 2017).

Closely Related Research

In the rest of this section we discuss how our algorithm relates to other attempts to connect online learning guarantees with model-free MARL. A comparison between our algorithm and other settings in online learning is deferred to Section 3, where we formally introduce our interactive bandit model.

The greatest inspiration for our algorithm is the *online variant of Monte Carlo CFR (online MCCFR)* algorithm proposed in passing by (Lanctot et al. 2009). Unlike the traditional “self-play” MCCFR, *online MCCFR* does not assume that the algorithm have control over the environment. The authors note that in theory online MCCFR could be used to play games in a model-free fashion, provided that a lower bound on the reach probability of every terminal state can be enforced. That lower bound, say η , is necessary for them to invoke their main theorem, which guarantees $O(\eta^{-1}T^{1/2}\sqrt{1/p})$ regret with probability $1 - p$. They suggest perhaps using some form of ϵ -greedy exploration at each decision node to enforce the lower bound, but no guarantee is provided and the authors then move away from this side note to focus on the self-play case. We show that their proposed approach encounters significant hurdles. First, using exploration at each decision node results in a lower bound on the reach of every terminal state on the order of $\eta = \epsilon^d$, where d is the depth of the decision process, thus making the regret bound not polynomial in the size of the decision process itself, but rather exponential. Second, the paper did not provide theoretical guarantees for the online case. In particular, the theory does not take into account the degradation effect caused by the exploration itself, which scales roughly as ηT . So, on the one hand, a large η is needed to keep the term η^{-1} in their regret bound under control, but at the same time a large η results in a ηT term being added to the regret. These hurdles show that it is unlikely that their approach can lead to $O(T^{1/2}\sqrt{1/p})$ regret with high probability $1 - p$ as they hypothesized. We address those issues by using a different type of exploration and being careful about bounding the degradation terms in the regret incurred due to the exploration. Because of the latter, our algorithm incurs $O(T^{3/4}\sqrt{\log(1/p)})$ regret with high probability against adversarial opponents. Because the exponent is less than 1, ours is truly a regret minimization algorithm for TFSDMs with unknown structure, and to our knowledge, the first. At the same time, our exponent is worse than the originally hypothesized exponent $1/2$. It is unknown whether the latter can be achieved. Finally, our dependence on p is better than in their hypothesized regret bound.

A recent paper by Srinivasan et al. (2018) related policy gradient algorithms to CFR (and, to a much lesser degree, MCCFR). Despite their experiments demonstrating empirical convergence rates for sampled versions of their algorithms, formal guarantees are only obtained for tabularized policy iteration in self-play, and use policy representations that require costly ℓ_2 projections back into the policy space. In contrast, our regret guarantees hold (i) in any TFSDM setting (not just two-player zero-sum extensive-form games), (ii) in high probability, (iii) with sampling, and (iv) when playing against any environment, even an adversarial one, without

requiring complex projections.

A very recent paper (Zhou, Li, and Zhu 2020) on two-player zero-sum games proposes combining full-information regret minimization with posterior sampling (Strens 2000) to estimate the utility function of the player and transition model of chance, both of which they assume to be time independent unlike our setting. They show in-expectation bounds under the assumption that the agent’s strategy space is known *ex ante*. We operate in a significantly more general setting where the observations and utilities are decided by the environment and can change—even adversarially—between iterations. Like theirs, our algorithm converges to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games when used in self play. However, unlike theirs, our algorithm is a regret minimizer that can be used for other purposes also, such as finding a coarse correlated equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum games, a quantal-response equilibrium, or safe exploitative strategies. In the latter two applications, the payoff function, in effect, changes as the agent changes its strategy. Our regret guarantees hold in high probability and we do not assume *ex ante* knowledge of the agent’s strategy space.

A different line of work has combined fictitious play (Brown 1951) with deep learning for function approximation (Heinrich, Lanctot, and Silver 2015; Heinrich and Silver 2016). Those methods do not give regret guarantees. Finally, other work has studied how to combine the guarantees of on-line learning with MDPs. Kash, Sullins, and Hofmann (2020) combine the idea of breaking up and minimizing regret locally at each decision point, proper of CFR, with Q-learning, obtaining an algorithm with certain in-the-limit guarantees for MDPs. Even-Dar, Kakade, and Mansour (2009) study online optimization (in the full-feedback setting, as opposed to bandit) in general MDPs where the reward function and the structure of the MDP is known. Neu et al. (2010) study online bandit optimization in MDPs in the *oblivious* setting, achieving $O(T^{2/3})$ regret with high probability, again assuming that the MDP’s structure is known and certain conditions are met. Zimin and Neu (2013) give bandit guarantees for episodic MDPs with a fixed known transition function.

2 Our Model for (Unknown) Tree-Form Sequential Decision Making and Games

In this section, we introduce the notation for TFSDM problems that we will be using for the rest of the paper.

A *tree-form sequential decision making (TFSDM) problem* is structured as a tree made of three types of nodes: (i) *decision nodes* j , in which the agent acts by selecting an action from the finite set A_j (different decision nodes can admit different sets of allowed actions); (ii) *observation points* k , where the agent observes one out of set S_k of finitely many possible signal from the environment (different observation points can admit different sets of possible signals); and (iii) *terminal nodes*, corresponding to the end of the decision process. We denote the set of decision nodes in the tree-form sequential decision making problem as \mathcal{J} , the set of observation points as \mathcal{K} , and the set of terminal nodes as Z . Furthermore, we let ρ denote the dynamics of the game: selecting action $a \in A_j$ at decision node $j \in \mathcal{J}$ makes the

process transition to the next state $\rho(j, a) \in \mathcal{J} \cup \mathcal{K} \cup Z$, while the process transitions to $\rho(k, s) \in \mathcal{J} \cup \mathcal{K} \cup Z$ whenever the agent observes signal $s \in S_k$ at observation point $k \in \mathcal{K}$.

Our algorithm operates in the difficult setting where the structure of the TFSDM problem is at first unknown and can be discovered only through exploration. Decisions and observation nodes are revealed only at the time the agent encounters them for the first time. As soon as a decision node j is revealed for the first time, its corresponding set of actions A_j is revealed with it.

Sequences In line with the game theory literature, we call a *sequence* a decision node-action pair; each sequence (j, a) uniquely identifies a path from the root of the decision process down to action a at decision node j , included. Formally, we define the set of sequences as $\Sigma := \{(j, a) : j \in \mathcal{J}, a \in A_j\} \cup \{\emptyset\}$, where the special element \emptyset is called the *empty sequence*. Given a decision node $j \in \mathcal{J}$, its *parent sequence*, denoted p_j , is the last sequence (that is, decision node-action pair) encountered on the path from the root of the decision process down to j . If the agent does not act before j (that is, only observation points are encountered on the path from the root to j), we let $p_j = \emptyset$.

Given a terminal node $z \in Z$ and a sequence $(j, a) \in \Sigma$, we write $(j, a) \rightsquigarrow z$ to mean that the path from the root of the decision process to z passes through action a at decision node j . Similarly, given a terminal node $z \in Z$ and an observation node-signal pair (k, s) ($s \in S_k$), we write $(k, s) \rightsquigarrow z$ to indicate that the path from the root of the decision process to z passes through signal s at observation node k . Finally, we let $\sigma(z)$ be the last sequence (decision node-action pair) on the path from the root of the decision process to terminal node $z \in Z$.

Strategies Conceptually, a strategy for an agent in a tree-form sequential decision process specifies a distribution $x_j \in \Delta^{|A_j|}$ over the set of actions A_j at each decision node $j \in \mathcal{J}$. We represent a strategy using the *sequence-form representation*, that is, as a vector $\mathbf{q} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{|\Sigma|}$ whose entries are indexed by Σ . The entry $q[j, a]$ contains the product of the probabilities of all actions at all decision nodes on the path from the root of the process down to and including action a at decision node $j \in \mathcal{J}$. A vector $\mathbf{q} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{|\Sigma|}$ is a valid sequence-form strategy if and only if it satisfies the constraints (i) $\sum_{a \in A_j} q[j, a] = q[p_j]$ for all $j \in \mathcal{J}$; and (ii) $x[\emptyset] = 1$ (Romanovskii 1962; Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel 1994; von Stengel 1996). We let Q denote the set of valid sequence-form strategies. Finally, we let $\Pi \subseteq Q$ denote the subset of sequence-form strategies whose entries are only 0 or 1; a strategy $\pi \in \Pi$ is called a *pure* sequence-form strategy, as it assigns probability 1 to exactly one action at each decision node.

3 Online Learning and Our Interactive Bandit Model

In online learning, an agent interacts with its environment in this order: (i) The environment chooses a (secret) gradient vector ℓ^t of bounded norm; (ii) The agent picks a pure strategy $\pi^t \in \Pi$. The environment evaluates the reward

(gain) of the agent as $(\ell^t)^\top \pi^t \in \mathbb{R}$; (iii) The agent observes some feedback about her reward. The feedback is used by the agent to learn to output good strategies over time. The learning is online in the sense that the strategy π^t at time t is output before any feedback for it (or future strategies) is available. A standard quality metric for evaluating an agent in this setting is the *regret* that she accumulates over time: $R^T(\hat{\pi}) := \sum_{t=1}^T (\ell^t)^\top \hat{\pi} - \sum_{t=1}^T (\ell^t)^\top \pi^t$. This measures the difference between the total reward accumulated up to time T , compared to the reward that would have been accumulated had the oracle output the fixed strategy $\hat{\pi} \in \Pi$ at all times. A “good” agent, that is, a *regret minimizer*, is one whose regret grows sublinearly: $R^T(\hat{\pi}) = o(T)$ for all $\hat{\pi} \in \Pi$.

Online learning models vary based on the type and extent of feedback that is made available to the agent. We will focus on two existing models—namely, the full-feedback² setting and the bandit linear optimization setting. Then we will introduce a third model that is especially natural for TFSDM.

Full-Feedback² Setting Here, the environment always reveals the full gradient vector ℓ^t to the agent (after the strategy has been output). This is the same setting that was proposed in the landmark paper by Zinkevich (2003) and is the most well-studied online optimization setting. Efficient agents that guarantee $O(T^{1/2})$ regret with high probability in the full-feedback setting are known well beyond TFSDM and extensive-form games (e.g., (Shalev-Shwartz 2012; Hazan 2016)). In fact, given any convex and compact set \mathcal{X} , it is possible to construct an agent that outputs decisions $x^t \in \mathcal{X}$ that achieves $O(T^{1/2})$ regret *in the worst case*, even when the gradient vectors ℓ^t are chosen adversarially by the environment *after* the decision x^t has been revealed. In the specific context of TFSDM and extensive-form games, the most widely-used oracle in the full-feedback setting is based on the counterfactual regret (CFR) framework (Zinkevich et al. 2007). The idea is to decompose the task of computing a strategy for the whole decision process into smaller sub-problems at each decision point. The local strategies are then computed via $|\mathcal{J}|$ independent full-feedback regret minimizers, one per decision node, that at each t observe a specific feedback that guarantees low global regret across the decision process. CFR guarantees $O(T^{1/2})$ regret with high probability against any strategy $\pi \in \Pi$.

Bandit Linear Optimization Here, the only feedback that the environment reveals to the agent is the utility $(\ell^t)^\top \pi^t$ at each time t (Kleinberg 2004; Flaxman, Kalai, and McMahan 2005). Despite this extremely limited feedback, $\tilde{O}(T^{1/2})$ regret can still be guaranteed with high probability in some domains (including simplexes (Auer et al. 2002) and spheres (Abernethy and Rakhlin 2009)), although, to our knowledge, a polynomial algorithm that guarantees $\tilde{O}(T^{1/2})$ regret with high probability for any convex and

compact domain has not been discovered yet.³ Guaranteeing $\tilde{O}(T^{1/2})$ *in expectation* is possible for any domain of decisions (Abernethy, Hazan, and Rakhlin 2008), but unfortunately in-expectation low regret is not strong enough a guarantee to enable, for instance, convergence to Nash or correlated equilibrium as described above. In the specific case of tree-form sequential decision processes, (Farina, Schmucker, and Sandholm 2021) proposed a bandit regret minimizer that achieves $O(T^{1/2})$ regret in expectation compared to any policy and linear-time iterations. Upgrading to in-high-probability $O(T^{1/2})$ regret guarantees while retaining linear-time iterations remains an open problem.

Interactive Bandit We propose *interactive bandits* as a natural online learning model to capture the essence of tree-form sequential decision processes. Here, an agent interacts with the environment until a terminal state is reached, at which point the payoff (a real number) is revealed to the agent. The agent observes the environment’s action (signal) whenever the interaction moves to an observation point. We formalize this as an online learning model as follows. At all times t , before the agent acts, the environment privately selects (i) a choice of payoff $u^t : Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ for each terminal state $z \in Z$, and (ii) a secret choice of signals $s_k^t \in S_k$ for all observation points $k \in \mathcal{K}$. These choices are hidden, and only the signals relevant to the observation points reached during the interaction will be revealed. Similarly, only the payoff $u^t(z^t)$ relative to the terminal state z^t reached in the interaction will be revealed. In other words, the feedback that is revealed to the agent after the interaction is the terminal state z^t that is reached (which directly captures all signals revealed by the environment, as they are the signals encountered on the path from the root of the decision process to z^t) and its corresponding payoff $u^t(z^t)$, which can be equivalently expressed as $u^t(z^t) = (\ell^t)^\top \pi^t$, where the gradient vector ℓ^t is defined as the (unique) vector such that for all strategies $x \in Q$,

$$(\ell^t)^\top x = \sum_{z \in Z} u^t(z) \left(\prod_{(k,s) \rightsquigarrow z} \mathbf{1}[s_k^t = s] \right) x[\sigma(z)]. \quad (1)$$

We assume that the environment is adversarial, in the sense that the environment’s choices of payoffs u^t and signals s_k^t at time t can depend on the previous actions of the agent.

Our term “interactive bandits” comes from the fact that an algorithm for this setting can be thought of as interacting with the environment until a terminal state of the decision process is reached and a corresponding payoff is revealed. In other words, while for modeling purposes it is convenient to think about online learning algorithms as outputting strategies π for the *whole* strategy space, one can think of an interactive bandits algorithm as one that instead only outputs one action

³Several algorithms are able to guarantee one or two out of the three requirements (i) applicable to any convex domain, (ii) polynomial time per iteration, (iii) $\tilde{O}(T^{1/2})$ regret with high probability. For example, Bartlett et al. (2008) achieve (i) and (iii) by extending an earlier paper by Dani, Kakade, and Hayes (2008), and (Györfgy et al. 2007) achieves (ii) for the set of flows with suboptimal regret guarantees.

²In online learning, “full-feedback” is typically called “full-information”. We use “full-feedback” to avoid confusion with full-information games, that is, games where the full state is available to all players at all times.

at a time as the interaction moves throughout the decision process.

Since the interactive bandit model requires that the gradient vector ℓ^t be expressible as in (1), it makes more assumptions on the gradient vector than either the bandit linear optimization model or the full-feedback model. In terms of feedback, it is an intermediate model: it receives a superset of the feedback that the bandit linear optimization framework receives, but significantly less than the full-feedback model. So, theoretically, one could always use an algorithm for the bandit linear optimization model to solve a problem in the interactive bandit model. However, as we show in this paper, one can design a regret-minimization algorithm for the interactive bandit model that achieves sublinear $O(T^{3/4})$ regret with high probability *even in decision processes and extensive-form games whose decision space is at first unknown*. To our knowledge, no algorithm guaranteeing sublinear regret when the decision space is at first unknown has been designed for bandit linear optimization.

4 Algorithm for Unknown Tree-Form Sequential Decision Making Problems

We now describe a regret minimizer for the interactive bandit model. At all time t , it goes through two phases: first, the *rollout* phase, and then the *regret update* phase. During the rollout phase, the algorithm plays until a terminal state z^t and its corresponding payoff u^t is revealed. During the regret update phase, the algorithm rewinds through the decision nodes j encountered during that trajectory, and updates certain parameters at those decision nodes based on the newly-observed payoff u^t .⁴ Like the CFR framework, our algorithm picks actions at each decision node j by means of a *local* full-feedback regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_j for the action set A_j at that decision node.

Rollout Phase: Playing the Game

We describe two alternative algorithms for the rollout phase (namely the “upfront-flipping” and the “on-path-flipping” rollout variants), which differ in the way they mix exploration and exploitation. Both variants are theoretically sound, and yield to the same sublinear in-high-probability regret bound (Section 5), even when different variants are used at different times t while playing against the adversarial opponent.

We start from the “upfront-flipping” variant, which is arguably the conceptually simpler variant, although we find it to usually perform worse in practice.

Upfront-Flipping Rollout Variant When the *upfront-flipping rollout variant* is used at time t , at the beginning of the rollout phase and before any action is played, a biased coin is tossed to decide the algorithm used to play out the interaction:

⁴While our algorithm shares many of the building blocks on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS)—incremental tree-building, back-propagation, rollouts—it is *not* an anytime search algorithm, at least not in the sense of traditional game-tree search like the one employed by the Online Outcome Sampling algorithm (Lisý, Lanctot, and Bowling 2015).

- With probability β^t , the EXPLORE routine is used. It ignores the recommendations of the local regret minimizers at each decision node and instead plays according to the *exploration function* $h^t : \Sigma \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{>0}$ (more details are below). In particular, at every decision node j encountered during the rollout, the agent picks action $a \in A_j$ at random according to the distribution $h^t(j, a) / (\sum_{a' \in A_j} h^t(j, a'))$.
- With probability $1 - \beta^t$, the EXPLOIT routine is used. With this routine, at every decision node j encountered during the rollout, the agent picks a decision by sampling from the distribution $x_j^t \in \Delta^{|A_j|}$ recommended by the regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_j .

In both cases, a regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_j for decision node j is created when j is first discovered.

Our upfront-flipping rollout strategy differs from the ϵ -greedy strategy in that the coin is tossed for the entire trajectory, not at each decision point.

On-Path-Flipping Rollout Variant In the *on-path-flipping* rollout variant, there is no single coin toss to distinguish between exploration and exploitation, and the two are interleaved throughout the rollout. Before any action is picked, the two *reach* quantities r^t, \hat{r}^t are both set to 1. Then, the rollout phase begins, and eventually the agent will be required to make a decision (pick an action) at some decision point j . Let $x_j^t \in \Delta^{|A_j|}$ be the distribution over actions recommended by the regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_j . In the on-path-flipping rollout variant, the agent picks an action $a \in A_j$ at j with probability proportional to

$$(1 - \beta^t)r^t \cdot x_j^t[a] + \beta^t \hat{r}^t \cdot \frac{h^t(j, a)}{\sum_{a' \in A_j} h^t(j, a')}.$$

Let a^* be the chosen action; r^t and \hat{r}^t are updated according to the formulas $r^t \leftarrow r^t \cdot x_j^t[a^*]$ and $\hat{r}^t \leftarrow \hat{r}^t \cdot \frac{h^t(j, a^*)}{\sum_{a' \in A_j} h^t(j, a')}$.

The agent keeps using this specific way of selecting actions and updating the reach quantities r, \hat{r} for all decision points encountered during the rollout.

The role of h^t In both variants, the role of the exploration function h^t is to guide exploration of different parts of the decision process.⁵ The optimal choice for h^t is to have $h^t(j, a)$ measure the number of terminal states in the subtree rooted at (j, a) . When this information is not available, a heuristic can be used instead. If no sensible heuristic can be devised, the uniform exploration strategy $h^t(j, a) = 1$ for all $(j, a) \in \Sigma$ is always a valid fallback. In Theorem 1 below, we give guarantees about the regret cumulated by our algorithm that apply to any $h^t : \Sigma \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{>0}$.

Regret Update Phase: Propagating the Payoff up the Tree

In the regret update phase, the revealed feedback (that is, the revealed utility $u^t(z^t)$ and the terminal state z^t that was

⁵Despite the positive exploration term induced by h^t , it is not guaranteed that all decision points will be discovered as $T \rightarrow \infty$ as the adversarial environment might prevent so. Nonetheless, our algorithm guarantees sublinear regret with high probability.

reached in the rollout phase) is used to construct suitable *local* gradient vectors ℓ_j^t for each of the local regret minimizers \mathcal{R}_j on the path from the terminal state z^t up to the root. Let $(j_1, a_1), \dots, (j_m, a_m)$ be the sequence of decision nodes and actions that were played, in order, that ultimately led to terminal state z^t during the repetition of the game at time t . We start to construct local gradient vectors from decision node j_m , where we set the three quantities

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma^t &:= (1 - \beta^t) \cdot \prod_{i=1}^m x_{j_i}^t[a_i] + \beta^t \cdot \prod_{i=1}^m \frac{h^t(j_i, a_i)}{\sum_{a' \in A_{j_i}} h^t(j_i, a')}, \\ \hat{u}_{j_m}^t &:= \frac{u^t(z^t)}{\gamma^t}, \quad \ell_{j_m}^t := \hat{u}_{j_m}^t e_{a_m}, \end{aligned}$$

where we used the notation $e_{a_m} \in \Delta^{A_{j_m}}$ to denote the a_m -th canonical vector, that is the vector whose components are all 0 except for the a_m -th entry, which is 1. Then, for all $i = 1, \dots, m-1$, we recursively let

$$\hat{u}_{j_i}^t := x_{j_i}^t[a_i] \cdot \hat{u}_{j_{i+1}}^t, \quad \ell_{j_i}^t := \hat{u}_{j_i}^t e_{a_i}.$$

Finally, for all $i = 1, \dots, m$, the gradient vector $\ell_{j_i}^t$ is revealed as feedback to the local full-feedback regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_{j_i} at decision point j_i .

Average Policy

When regret minimizers are used to solve a convex-concave saddle point problem (such as a Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum game), only the profile of *average* policies produced by the regret minimizers are guaranteed to converge to the saddle point. For this reason, it is crucial to be able to represent the *average* policy of an agent. Since we are assuming that the structure of the decision problem is only partially known, this operation requires more care in our setting. As we now show, it is possible to modify the algorithm so that the average policy can be extracted.

In order to maintain the average policy, we maintain an additional vector \bar{x}_j at each discovered decision node j . Intuitively, these vector will be populated with entries from the cumulative sum of all partial sequence-form strategies recommended so far by the \mathcal{R}_j 's. As soon as j is discovered for the first time (say, time t), we create its \bar{x}_j . If j 's parent sequence is the empty sequence (that is, j is one of the possible first decision nodes in the TFSDM process, i.e., j is preceded only by observation nodes), we simply set $\bar{x}_j[a]^t := t/|A_j|$ for all $a \in A_j$. Otherwise, let $p_j = (j', a')$ be the parent sequence of j , and we set $\bar{x}_j[a]^t := \bar{x}_{j'}[a']/|A_j|$ for all $a \in A_j$. Then, at all times t , after the feedback has been received but before the regret update phase has started, we introduce a new *average policy update phase*. In it, we iterate through all the decision nodes j_i that have been discovered so far (that is, the union of all decision points discovered up to time t), in the order they have been discovered. For each of them, we update \bar{x}_{j_i} according to the following rule. Let x_{j_i} be the policy strategy returned by the local full-feedback regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_{j_i} . If j_i 's parent sequence is the empty sequence, we simply set $\bar{x}_{j_i}^{t+1} := \bar{x}_{j_i}^t + x_{j_i}$ and $r_{j_i}^t := x_{j_i}$. Otherwise, let $p_{j_i} = (j', a')$ be the parent sequence of j_i , and we set $\bar{x}_{j_i}^{t+1} := \bar{x}_{j_i}^t + r_{j'}^t[a'] \cdot x_{j_i}^t$, and $r_{j_i}^t[a] := r_{j'}^t[a'] \cdot x_{j_i}^t[a]$ for all $a \in A_{j_i}$.

In order to play the average policy, it is enough to play actions proportionally to \bar{x}_j^{t+1} at all discovered decision nodes j , and actions picked uniformly at random at undiscovered decision nodes.

Observation 1. *In all phases, the agent performs an amount of operations at most linear in the number of actions $|A_j|$ at each decision point j discovered up to time t . So, the average policy update phase requires work at most linear in the size of the underlying TFSDM.*

5 Guarantees on Regret

In this section, we provide a sketch of the key logical steps in our proof of the sublinear regret guarantees for the algorithm we just described in Section 4.⁶ In order to make the analysis approachable, we start by presenting a *conceptual* version of our algorithm under the assumption that the structure of the tree-form sequential decision problem is fully known. As it turns out, our conceptual algorithm can be implemented exactly as in Section 4, and therefore, it does not actually need to know the structure of the decision process in advance.

At a high level, the construction of our conceptual interactive bandit regret minimizer works as follows (see also Figure 1). At each iteration t , we use a full-feedback regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_Q to output a recommendation for the next sequence-form strategy $\mathbf{y}^t \in Q$ to be played. Then, we introduce a bias on \mathbf{y}^t , which can be thought of as an exploration term. The resulting biased strategy is $\mathbf{w}^t \in Q$. Finally, we sample a deterministic policy $\boldsymbol{\pi}^t \in \Pi$ starting from \mathbf{w}^t . After the playthrough is over and a terminal node $z^t \in Z$ has been reached, we use the feedback (that is, the terminal node z^t reached in the playthrough, together with its utility $u^t(z^t)$), to construct an unbiased estimator $\tilde{\ell}^t$ of the underlying gradient vector that was chosen by the environment.

Our full-feedback regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_Q is the counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithm (Zinkevich et al. 2007). At all times t , CFR combines the strategies output by the local regret minimizers \mathcal{R}_j ($j \in \mathcal{J}$), one per decision node, into the strategy $\mathbf{y}^t \in Q$ for the overall TFSDM problem. CFR guarantees $O(T^{1/2})$ regret in the worst case against any strategy $\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in Q$.

The gradient estimator that we use in our algorithm is a form of importance-sampling estimator that can be constructed starting from the feedback received by the regret minimizer (that is, the terminal leaf z^t and its corresponding payoff $u^t(z^t)$). It is a particular instantiation of the *outcome sampling* estimator that appeared in the works by Lanctot et al. (2009) and Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm (2020), and is defined as

$$\tilde{\ell}^t := \frac{u^t(z^t)}{w^t[\sigma(z^t)]} e_{\sigma(z^t)}, \quad (2)$$

where $e_{\sigma(z^t)} \in \mathbb{R}^{|\Sigma|}$ is the vector that has zeros everywhere but in the component corresponding to the terminal sequence $\sigma(z^t)$, where it has a one.

The role of the exploration term is to reduce the norm of the gradient estimators, by making sure that the denominator

⁶More details and full proofs are available in the full version of this paper, which is available on arXiv.




Figure 1: Conceptual construction of our algorithm for the interactive bandit online learning setting.

$w^t[\sigma(z^t)]$ in (2) is never too small. We bias the strategies \mathbf{y}^t output by \mathcal{R}_Q by taking a convex combination

$$\mathbf{w}^t := (1 - \beta^t) \cdot \mathbf{y}^t + \beta^t \cdot \boldsymbol{\xi}^t$$

with the *exploration strategy* $\boldsymbol{\xi}^t \in Q$ defined as the sequence-form strategy that picks action $a \in A_j$ at decision node $j \in \mathcal{J}$ with probability proportional to

$$\xi^t[j, a] \propto \frac{h^t(j, a)}{\sum_{a \in A_j} h^t(j, a)}.$$

The role of the strategy sampler is to provide an *unbiased* estimator $\pi^t \in \Pi$ of \mathbf{w}^t . In fact, any unbiased estimator can be used in our framework, and in Section 4 we gave two: upfront-flipping and on-path-flipping strategy sampling.

Our analysis is split into two main conceptual steps. First, we quantify the regret degradation that is incurred in passing from $\tilde{\mathcal{R}}$ to \mathcal{R} (Figure 1). Specifically, we study how the regret cumulated by $\tilde{\mathcal{R}}$, $\tilde{R}^T(\boldsymbol{\pi}) := \sum_{t=1}^T (\tilde{\ell}^t)^\top (\boldsymbol{\pi} - \mathbf{y}^t)$, is related to the regret cumulated by our overall algorithm, $R^T(\boldsymbol{\pi}) := \sum_{t=1}^T (\ell^t)^\top (\boldsymbol{\pi} - \pi^t)$. In this case, the degradation term comes from the fact that the strategy output by \mathcal{R} , that is, $\pi^t \in \Pi$, is not the same as the one, \mathbf{y}^t , that was recommended by $\tilde{\mathcal{R}}$, because an exploration term was added. Using a concentration argument, the following inequality can be shown.

Proposition 1. *At all T , for all $p \in (0, 1)$ and $\boldsymbol{\pi} \in \Pi$, with probability at least $1 - p$,*

$$R^T(\boldsymbol{\pi}) \leq \tilde{R}^T(\boldsymbol{\pi}) + \Delta \left(\sqrt{2T \log \frac{1}{p}} + \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^t \right).$$

The second step in the analysis is the quantification of the regret degradation that is incurred in passing from \mathcal{R}_Q to $\tilde{\mathcal{R}}$ (Figure 1). Specifically, we will study how the regret cumulated by $\tilde{\mathcal{R}}$ is related to the regret $\mathcal{R}_Q^T(\boldsymbol{\pi}) := \sum_{t=1}^T (\tilde{\ell}^t)^\top (\boldsymbol{\pi} - \mathbf{y}^t)$, which is known to be $O(T^{1/2})$ with high probability from the analysis of the CFR algorithm. In particular, the following can be shown with a second concentration argument.

Proposition 2. *At all T , for all $p \in (0, 1)$ and $\boldsymbol{\pi} \in \Pi$, with probability at least $1 - p$,*

$$\tilde{R}^T(\boldsymbol{\pi}) \leq \mathcal{R}_Q^T(\boldsymbol{\pi}) + \frac{\Delta}{\beta^T} \nu \sqrt{2T \log \frac{1}{p}},$$

where

$$\nu := \sqrt{\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \max_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \left\{ \prod_{(j,a) \rightsquigarrow z} \left(\frac{\sum_{a' \in A_j} h^t(j, a')}{h^t(j, a)} \right)^2 \right\}}.$$

When h^t measures the number of terminal states reachable under any sequence (j, a) , the constant ν satisfies $\nu \leq |\Sigma| - 1$. For the uniform exploration function ($h^t(j, a) = 1$ for all j, a), ν is upper bounded by the product of the number of actions at all decision nodes, a polynomial quantity in “bushy” decision processes.

Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 using the union bound lemma, we obtain a general regret bound for \mathcal{R} that holds for any choice of local regret minimizers \mathcal{R}_j ($j \in \mathcal{J}$), non-increasing stepsizes β^t , and explorations functions h^t at all times t , which we formalize in Theorem 1. It will be the basis for Theorem 2, which provides a way to set the algorithm parameters to achieve sublinear $O(T^{3/4})$ regret.

Theorem 1. *Let $R_j^T(\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_j)$ denote the regret cumulated by the local full-feedback regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_j compared to a generic strategy $\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_j$, and Δ be the maximum range of payoffs that can be selected by the environment at all times. Then, for all $T \geq 1$, $p \in (0, 1)$, and $\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} \in Q$, with probability at least $1 - p$ the regret cumulated by the algorithm of Section 4 satisfies*

$$R^T(\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}) \leq \max_{q \in \Pi} \left\{ \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} q[p_j] \cdot \max_{\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_j \in \Delta^{A_j}} R_j^T(\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_j) \right\} + \frac{\Delta}{\beta^T} (1 + \nu) \sqrt{2T \log \frac{2}{p}} + \Delta \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^t,$$

where ν is as in Proposition 2.

In Theorem 2 we operationalize Theorem 1 by showing sensible choices of stepsizes β^t and local regret minimizers \mathcal{R}_j .

Theorem 2. *Let the local full-feedback regret minimizers \mathcal{R}_j guarantee $O(T^{1/2})$ regret in the worst case⁷, and let $p \in (0, 1)$. Furthermore, let the exploration probabilities be $\beta^t := \min\{1, k \cdot t^{-1/4}\}$ for all t , where $k > 0$ is an arbitrary constant. Then, there exists a (decision-problem-dependent) constant c independent of p and T such that for all $T \geq 1$*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\max_{\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} \in \Pi} R^T(\hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}) \leq c \cdot T^{3/4} \Delta \sqrt{\log \frac{2}{p}} \right] \geq 1 - p.$$

When h^t is an exact measure of the number of terminal states, c is polynomial in $|\Sigma|$. Otherwise, it is linear in the constant ν defined in Proposition 2, which depends on the specific exploration functions used.

⁷Valid choices include the following algorithms: regret matching (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), regret matching⁺ (Tammelin et al. 2015), follow-the-regularized-leader, online mirror descent, exponential weights, hedge, and others.

Since Theorem 2 guarantees sublinear regret with high probability, our algorithm can be used for all purposes described in Section 3, including computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum extensive-form game whose structure is *a priori* unknown.

6 Empirical Evaluation

In our experiments, we used our algorithm to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium. We compared our method to established model-free algorithms from the multiagent reinforcement learning and computational game theory literature for this setting: *neural fictitious self-play* (NFSP) (Heinrich and Silver 2016), the *policy gradient* (PG) approach of Srinivasan et al. (2018), and the *online variant of Monte-Carlo CFR* (online MCCFR) mentioned in (Lanctot et al. 2009). In line with prior empirical evaluations of those methods, we compare the algorithms on two standard benchmark games: Kuhn poker (Kuhn 1950) and Leduc poker (Southey et al. 2005). The games are reviewed in Appendix C in the full version of this paper.

We used the implementations of PG and NFSP provided in *OpenSpiel* (Lanctot et al. 2019). They internally use Tensorflow. For PG, we tested the RPG and QPG policy gradient formulations, but not the RM formulation (it performed worst in the original paper (Srinivasan et al. 2018)). We implemented online MCCFR and our algorithm in C++ (online MCCFR is not implemented in *OpenSpiel*). We ran every algorithm with five random seeds. In the figures below, we plot the average exploitability (a standard measure of closeness to equilibrium) of the players averaged across the five seeds. The shaded areas indicate the *maximum* and *minimum* over the five random seeds. For NFSP we used the hyperparameter recommended by the *OpenSpiel* implementation. For Kuhn poker, we used the settings for PG that were tuned and found to work the best by Srinivasan et al. (2018)—they are publicly available through *OpenSpiel*. For PG in Leduc poker, we performed a hyperparameter sweep and selected for the two PG plot (RPG and QPG formulation) the best combination hyperparameters (full details are in the appendix). For both online MCCFR and our algorithm, we used RM+ (Tamelin 2014) as the local (full-feedback) regret minimizer. For our algorithm, we only show performance for the on-path-flipping variant. The upfront-flipping variant performed significantly worse and data is available in the appendix of the full version of this paper. We tested $k \in \{0.5, 1, 10, 20\}$ and set h^t to either the uniform exploration function (h^t constant) or the theoretically-optimal exploration function h^t that measures the number of terminal nodes as explained in Section 4. The performance of the two exploration functions was nearly identical, so in Figure 2 we show our algorithm with the uniform exploration function. We chose $k = 10$ since that performed well on both games. The plots for all other hyperparameter combinations for our algorithm are in the appendix. For online MCCFR, the only hyperparameter is ϵ , which controls the ϵ -greediness of the exploration term added before sampling and outputting the strategy at each time t . We tested $\epsilon = 0.6$ (which was found useful for the different *self-play* MCCFR algorithm (Lanctot et al. 2009)), 0.1, and 0.0 (which corresponds to pure exploitation); Figure 2




Figure 2: Comparison of the algorithms.

shows the setting that performed best.

Out of all the algorithms, ours is the only one that guarantees sublinear regret with high probability. This superior guarantee appears to translate into superior practical performance as well. In both benchmark games, our algorithm has lowest exploitability, often by a factor 2x-4x.

7 Conclusions and Future Research

We introduced a new online learning model, which we coined the *interactive bandit model*, that captures tree-form sequential decision making. We developed an algorithm that guarantees sublinear $O(T^{3/4})$ regret with high probability in this model, even when the structure of the underlying decision problem is at first unknown to the agent and must be explored as part of the learning process. This is, to our knowledge, the first in-high-probability regret minimizer for this setting. It can be used for multiagent reinforcement learning. Its regret guarantee enables it to be used in any application for which regret minimization is useful: approximating Nash equilibrium or quantal response equilibrium (Ling, Fang, and Kolter 2018; Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2019) in two-player zero-sum games, approximating coarse correlated equilibrium in multi-player games (Moulin and Vial 1978; Celli et al. 2020), learning a best response, safe opponent exploitation (Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2019), online play against an unknown opponent/environment, etc. It is open whether better than $O(T^{3/4})$ regret is achievable in this important setting.

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