Before We Trust Them: Decision-Making Failures in Navigation of Foundation Models

Jua Han[*1†], **Jaeyoon Seo**[*1†], **Jungbin Min**[*2†]
Sieun Choi[1†], **Huichan Seo**[3], **Jihie Kim**[1], **Jean Oh**[3]

[1]Dongguk University, Seoul, South Korea
[2]Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, South Korea
[3]Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, United States
{juai,pianoprince,sieunchoi}@dgu.ac.kr, janice20@g.skku.edu, chans@andrew.cmu.edu, jihie.kim@dgu.edu, jeanoh@cmu.edu

Abstract

High success rates on navigation-related tasks do not necessarily translate into reliable decision making by foundation models. To examine this gap, we evaluate current models on six diagnostic tasks spanning three settings: reasoning under complete spatial information, reasoning under incomplete spatial information, and reasoning under safety-relevant information. Our results show that the current metrics may not capture critical limitations of the models and indicate good performance, underscoring the need for failure-focused analysis to understand model limitations and guide future progress. In a path-planning setting with unknown cells, GPT-5 achieved a high success rate of 93%; Yet, the failed cases exhibit fundamental limitations of the models, e.g., the lack of structural spatial understanding essential for navigation. We also find that newer models are not always more reliable than their predecessors on this end. In reasoning under safety-relevant information, Gemini-2.5 Flash achieved only 67% on the challenging emergency-evacuation task, underperforming Gemini-2.0 Flash, which reached 100% under the same condition. Across all evaluations, models exhibited structural collapse, hallucinated reasoning, constraint violations, and unsafe decisions. These findings show that foundation models still exhibit substantial failures in navigation-related decision making and require fine-grained evaluation before they can be trusted.

Project page —
https://cmubig.github.io/before-we-trust-them/

Introduction

As large language models (LLMs) and vision and language models (VLMs) are increasingly used for robotic planning and embodied decision making (Brohan et al. 2023; Yang et al. 2025c), an important question is not only whether they can solve tasks, but whether their decisions remain robust under varying conditions. Average accuracy alone is not sufficient for answering this question, because overall performance can obscure failures that become visible when models must preserve spatial structure, maintain consistency, or reason from incomplete context. This distinction matters in robotics because plausible outputs do not necessarily correspond to reliable decisions, and errors in grounding or reasoning may be difficult to detect before they lead to problematic actions (Liang et al. 2022a; Yin et al. 2024; Lu et al. 2025). Rather than introducing a new navigation benchmark purely for maximizing task success, our goal is to provide a diagnostic evaluation framework that reveals failure modes hidden by overall success rates.



Figure 1: In an emergency-evacuation task, Gemini-2.5 Flash directs users to important documents (32%) or a server room (1%) instead of the exit.

This gap becomes especially important when failures carry safety-relevant consequences. In our simulated fire-evacuation example shown in Fig. 1, Gemini-2.5 Flash (Google 2025) did not reliably prioritize the emergency exit. This illustrates how language-model outputs can appear plausible while remaining unreliable (Turpin et al. 2023). Notably, newer models were not always more reliable: under some emergency-evacuation tasks, Gemini-2.5 Flash underperformed Gemini-2.0 Flash (Google 2024) despite being the more recent model.

To systematically characterize these failures, we use six diagnostic tasks across three settings: reasoning under complete spatial information, reasoning under incomplete spatial information, and reasoning under safety-relevant information. These tasks are not primarily intended as new task formulations, but as controlled probes for exposing reliability failures that overall success rates can miss. Across these evaluations, we observe a consistent pattern: models that perform strongly

[*]These authors contributed equally.
[†]This paper is based on the work performed while the authors were visiting scholars at Carnegie Mellon University.



Figure 2: Overview of the three evaluation settings and representative input formats used in our evaluation. The figure summarizes reasoning under complete spatial information, reasoning under incomplete spatial information, and reasoning under safety-relevant information. In the prompts for reasoning under safety-relevant information, red text indicates phrases related to task difficulty, and blue text indicates important contextual clues.

in complete settings can still break down when reasoning requires preserving spatial structure, maintaining constraint consistency, inferring from incomplete context, or prioritizing safety under competing cues. Taken together, these results suggest that strong task performance is not enough to make model decisions trustworthy in navigation-related settings. The main contributions of this work are as follows:

- We present a diagnostic evaluation framework, instantiated with six tasks, for fine-grained analysis of navigation-related decision making under complete, incomplete, and safety-relevant information.
- We identify recurring failure modes in current LLMs and VLMs, including unstable spatial grounding, structural breakdown, hallucinated reasoning, explicit constraint violations, and unsafe choices in emergency scenarios.
- We show that strong performance does not guarantee reliable decision making, and that newer models are not consistently more reliable than earlier ones.

Related Work

Spatial Awareness in LLMs and VLMs

Recent work has explored the use of LLMs and VLMs for robotic reasoning and decision making, supported by large-scale visual-spatial datasets and benchmarks in 2D and 3D environments (Chen et al. 2024; Cheng et al. 2024; Yang et al. 2025b; Xu et al. 2025b; Yang et al. 2025a). Related studies on textual spatial reasoning, including *PlanQA*, *Visualization-of-Thought (VoT)*, and *SpatialPrompt*, further improve the alignment between language and geometric relations (Li et al. 2024b; Zhao et al. 2024; Liao et al. 2024). Nevertheless, prior benchmarks consistently report weaknesses in perspective transformation, spatial rotation, long-horizon planning, and environment-grounded reasoning (Zhang et al. 2025; Wang et al. 2024; Du et al. 2024; Li et al. 2024b; Liao et al. 2024). Moreover, strong task performance alone does not guarantee reliable decision making. While previous studies mainly evaluated spatial or navigation capability, our goal is not primarily to introduce a substantially new task family, but to use targeted diagnostic tasks to examine how and when current models fail to maintain valid decisions under incomplete context, structural constraints, and safety-relevant conditions.

Evaluation Metrics for Vision-Language Navigation

Vision-Language Navigation (VLN) is another closely related area, where agents navigate environments by following natural language instructions (Anderson et al. 2018; Ilharco et al. 2019; Pan et al. 2023; Krantz et al. 2020; Ku et al. 2020; Kuang, Lin, and Jiang 2024; Zhang et al. 2024). Standard VLN evaluation mainly relies on metrics such as Navigation Error, Success Rate, Oracle Success Rate, Trajectory Length (Anderson et al. 2018), and Dynamic Time Warping-

based measures for path fidelity (Ilharco et al. 2019). While these benchmarks are effective for measuring navigation performance, they are less informative about whether model decisions remain reliable when conditions become uncertain or failure-sensitive. By contrast, our work focuses on failure patterns in navigation-related decision making, using diagnostic tasks not simply to measure overall task success, but to reveal reliability failures that conventional aggregate metrics can miss.

Reliability and Safety Evaluation for Embodied Decision Making

Recent work has increasingly emphasized that strong average performance does not necessarily imply reliable behavior in embodied or safety-sensitive settings (Liang et al. 2022a; Yin et al. 2024; Huang et al. 2025b; Lu et al. 2025). These studies show that models can appear capable under standard evaluation while still failing under hazardous, uncertain, or high-stakes conditions. Our work is closely related to this line of research, but differs in emphasis. Rather than evaluating broad embodied-agent behavior alone, we focus on fine-grained decision-making failures in navigation-related tasks, asking when high task success masks unreliable outputs such as invalid paths, constraint violations, hallucinated reasoning, and unsafe choices. This perspective allows us to connect spatial reasoning evaluation with failure-focused analysis, and to frame our contribution as a diagnostic evaluation of hidden failure modes rather than as task formulation novelty alone.

Methodology

To evaluate the safety and reliability of LLMs and VLMs, we designed six tasks across three categories based on the level of spatial inference they require. In this section, we define these categories as concrete experimental settings.

Reasoning under Complete Spatial Information

We evaluate reasoning under complete spatial information using ASCII grid maps, as shown in Fig. 2. In this setting, every cell is fully specified: `S` denotes the start, `G` the goal, `#` obstacles, and `.` free space. This symbolic formulation removes environmental uncertainty and allows us to assess spatial planning independently of visual perception, thereby preventing information loss in modality transformation and errors caused by cross-modal misalignment (Liang et al. 2022b; Yi, Douady, and Chen 2025). For each map, the model is asked to find a safe path from `S` to `G`, draw the route directly on the map, and provide the ordered coordinates of the path. We use three difficulty levels, easy, normal, and hard, which increase obstacle density and route complexity. This setting examines whether the model can preserve the structural integrity of the input map while generating a valid path when the environment is fully specified.

Reasoning under Incomplete Spatial Information

We evaluate reasoning under incomplete spatial information in two complementary settings, as shown in Fig. 2. Path planning with unknown cells introduces unknown regions into symbolic maps and examines path planning under partial observability. Egocentric sequence reasoning follows the VLN input sequence and evaluates whether the model can faithfully track the underlying spatial trajectory and navigation cues from sequential observations, rather than relying on superficial visual similarity.

Path planning with unknown cells. We extend the ASCII grid setting from the complete-information setting by introducing unknown cells. As shown in Fig. 2, we construct two maps with unknown cells. In Map 1, the model may either avoid unknown cells or move through them, depending on its assumption. In Map 2, however, the goal cannot be reached unless the model traverses at least one unknown cell. Therefore, Map 2 has two correct paths depending on the model's assumption. One correct output is to assume that at least one `?` is traversable and produce a valid path from `S` to `G` through it. The other correct output is to assume that `?` is non-traversable, explicitly conclude that no valid path exists under this assumption, and refrain from generating a path. This setting examines whether the model can reason under partial observability.

Egocentric sequence reasoning. We also evaluate reasoning under incomplete spatial information using short egocentric image sequences that depict a navigation trajectory in an indoor environment. In this setting, correct responses depend on preserving spatial continuity across frames rather than relying on isolated appearance cues. We examine this setting through two complementary tasks. In turn-direction inference, the model receives an ordered sequence and must infer the turning direction supported by the visual evidence. In missing-frame selection, one intermediate frame is omitted and replaced with a blank slot, and the model must select the missing frame from two candidate images, as shown in Fig. 2. Although the candidates are visually similar, only one is consistent with the temporal progression of the sequence. This design allows us to assess whether the model's response is grounded in the observed trajectory.

Reasoning under Safety-Relevant Information

We evaluate reasoning under safety-relevant information using natural-language scenarios that require directional inference and safety-aware decision making without structured map inputs, as shown in Fig. 2. The task setting covers both instruction following and emergency decision making under context-rich prompts.

Orientation-tracking. In this task, a virtual character initially faces north and executes instructions such as going straight, turning left or right, and making a U-turn, and the model must infer the final facing direction. We use three difficulty levels, easy, normal, and hard, by increasing the length of the instruction sequence and, at the hardest level, introducing distracting but non-decisive information.

Emergency evacuation. In this task, the model must choose among four directions based on textual descriptions of the front, back, left, and right options in a fire scenario. The hard prompt introduces goal-conflicting information involving important thesis-related materials located elsewhere in

Task Type	Gemini-2.5 Flash (Google 2025)	Gemini-2.0 Flash (Google 2024)	GPT-5 (OpenAI 2025)	GPT-4o (OpenAI 2024)	Llama-3-8b (Grattafiori et al. 2024)
Map-Based Task					
Complete (Easy)	66 (55.85 - 75.18)	100 (96.38 - 100)	100 (96.38 - 100)	80 (70.82 - 87.33)	0 (0 - 3.62)
Complete (Normal)	93 (86.11 - 97.14)	0 (0 - 3.62)	100 (96.38 - 100)	0 (0 - 3.62)	0 (0 - 3.62)
Complete (Hard)	73 (63.20 - 81.39)	0 (0 - 3.62)	100 (96.38 - 100)	0 (0 - 3.62)	0 (0 - 3.62)
Unknown–Map 1	90 (82.38 - 95.10)	0 (0 - 3.62)	100 (96.38 - 100)	0 (0 - 3.62)	0 (0 - 3.62)
Unknown–Map 2	56 (45.72 - 65.92)	0 (0 - 3.62)	93 (86.11 - 97.14)	0 (0 - 3.62)	0 (0 - 3.62)
Reasoning under Safety-Relevant Information Task					
Orientation-Tracking (Easy)	98 (82.38 - 95.10)	99 (94.55-99.97)	98 (82.38 - 95.10)	94 (87.40 - 97.77)	7 (02.86 - 13.89)
Orientation-Tracking (Normal)	100 (96.38 - 100)	72 (62.13 - 80.52)	82 (73.05 - 88.97)	66 (55.85 - 75.18)	12 (06.36 - 20.02)
Orientation-Tracking (Hard)	100 (96.38 - 100)	42 (32.20 - 52.29)	100 (96.38 - 100)	53 (42.76 - 63.06)	51 (40.80 - 61.14)
Emergency Evacuation (Easy)	100 (96.38 - 100)	100 (96.38 - 100)	100 (96.38 - 100)	100 (96.38 - 100)	100 (96.38 - 100)
Emergency Evacuation (Hard)	67 (56.88 - 76.08)	100 (96.38 - 100)	100 (96.38 - 100)	98 (92.96 - 99.76)	46 (35.98 - 56.26)

Table 1: Success rates and 95% confidence intervals (%) of LLMs across map-based tasks and reasoning under safety-relevant information tasks. In the map-based tasks, Complete denotes tasks under reasoning under complete spatial information, whereas Unknown refers to path planning with unknown cells under reasoning under incomplete spatial information.



Figure 3: Success rates of LLMs on ASCII map tasks. Complete refers to maps used for Reasoning under Complete Spatial Information. Unknown refers to maps used for Path Planning with Unknown Cells.

the building, allowing us to test whether the model maintains human safety as the primary objective.

Experiments and Results

We selected several representative VLMs that are frequently compared in recent studies, including Gemini-2.5 Flash, Gemini-2.0 Flash (Google 2025, 2024), GPT-5, GPT-4o (OpenAI 2025, 2024), and Llama-3-8b (Grattafiori et al. 2024), and VLMs with LLaVA-v1.6-vicuna-13b, LLaVA-v1.6-vicuna-7b, LLaVA-v1.6-mistral-7b (Liu et al. 2024a), LLaVA-v1.5-7b (Liu et al. 2024b), Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct, Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct (Bai et al. 2025), Qwen2.5-Omni-7B (Xu et al. 2025a), and InternVL3-14B (Zhu et al. 2025), with each model tested 100 times per task. The chosen models span a wide range of parameter scales to ensure coverage across diverse capacity levels. Both temperature and top-p were set to 1, as this configuration is widely used in many documents and is intended to reflect a general-use setting.

Reasoning under Complete Spatial Information

Experimental setup. The experiments were designed to quantitatively and qualitatively assess each model's spatial reasoning and decision-making ability under complete spatial information. Table 1 and Fig. 3 summarize the overall success rates. Performance was assessed using five criteria: (1) reaching `G` from `S`; (2) avoiding traversal of `#` (obstacle) cells; (3) preserving the input map structure, including dimensions, tokens, and spacing; (4) maintaining a continuous path between `S` and `G` under 4-neighborhood adjacency (up, down, left, right; no diagonals); and (5) matching the visualized path to the coordinate sequence in both order and alignment. Path optimality was not considered; the evaluation focused solely on the validity and accuracy of the generated routes.

Reliable and adaptive reasoning. GPT-5 achieved a 100% success rate across all maps (Easy, Normal, and Hard), satisfying every evaluation criterion. It consistently preserved grid integrity, maintained spatial continuity, and demonstrated strong adherence to obstacle constraints. Notably, on the Normal map, GPT-5 produced multiple distinct yet valid route variants, indicating flexible reasoning grounded in the problem structure rather than rigid pattern replication.

Abrupt collapse. Gemini-2.0 Flash and GPT-4o exhibited collapse once the map complexity increased. Their success rates dropped sharply from 100% and 80% on the Easy map to 0% on both the Normal and Hard maps (Table 1, Map-Based Task–Complete), revealing an abrupt collapse rather than a gradual degradation. In these cases, paths frequently terminated mid-route, suggesting an inability to sustain topological continuity or reason through obstacle-dense environments.

Structural integrity failure. This task requires the model to preserve all symbols in the input map (`S`, `#`, `.`, `?`, and `G`) while generating a continuous and valid path using only `*` on free-space cells originally marked as `.`. Llama-3-8b achieved a 0% success rate across all maps. As shown in Fig. 4, it not only failed to produce a continuous path, but also used invalid symbols such as `?` in places where the path should have been marked with `*`. In addition, the model failed to preserve the input map structure itself, often producing outputs that appeared collapsed or disorganized. These results



Figure 4: Examples of map outputs for (a) Reasoning under Complete Spatial Information Map–Easy and (b) Reasoning under Incomplete Spatial Information–Path Planning with Unknown Cells Map 1. Red boxes indicate actual Llama-3-8B outputs that do not preserve the input map structure and generate discontinuous, invalid paths, while green boxes show example correct answers with preserved map structures and continuous, valid paths.

indicate a severe breakdown in structural preservation and path generation, rather than a simple path-planning error.

Reasoning under Incomplete Spatial Information

Path Planning with Unknown Cells

Experimental setup. Each model was evaluated 100 times per map on two maps with unknown cells, Map 1 and Map 2, using the same evaluation framework as in the complete spatial information setting, except that the models were required to plan routes in the presence of unknown cells. In addition to the five evaluation criteria, models were required to handle unknown `?` cells according to their self-chosen assumption, either *passable* or *not passable*. This additional condition allowed us to assess how models reason and plan under partial observability and incomplete environmental information, with quantitative results shown in Table 1.

Constraint-aware reasoning and safe adaptation. GPT-5 again achieved the highest performance, with 100% success on unknown cells Map 1 and 93% on Map 2. In all Map 1 trials, it stated, "I assume that unknown cells `?` is not passable," demonstrating a stable safety-first bias. When the goal in Map 2 became unreachable under this assumption, GPT-5 correctly responded, "*No path exists under this assumption*," in 27% of the runs. Although two Map 2 failures (7%) involved diagonal movement, an explicitly prohibited action, these violations highlight a critical insight: high accuracy does not imply safety. In practical robotic settings, such violations may lead to unsafe or physically infeasible behaviors.

Partial alignment, fragile consistency. Gemini-2.5 Flash showed partial alignment with GPT-5's reasoning but lower reliability. While it adopted the same "not passable" assumption in most Map 1 runs (97%), its success rate dropped to 57% on Map 2, with frequent failures such as obstacle traversal and map collapse. These results indicate that although the model could imitate safety-oriented reasoning, it failed to maintain constraint consistency once uncertainty was introduced. Similarly, Llama-3-8b showed the same collapse pattern observed in the complete-setting results, failing entirely on maps with unknown cells (Fig. 4).

Egocentric Sequence Reasoning

Experimental setup. We constructed a dataset of 100 short navigation trajectories, evenly divided between indoor and outdoor environments, with each trajectory containing both left and right turns. From each video, we extracted five representative frames. In the turn-direction inference task, the five frames were concatenated in their natural temporal order. To address cases where a model could not process multiple images simultaneously, we combined the sequence frames into a single concatenated image. In the missing-frame selection task, selected context frames were combined while one intermediate frame was masked out, and two candidate images were provided for selection. The prompts used in these tasks are shown in Fig. 2. For the missing-frame selection task, accuracy was computed based on whether the model selected the correct candidate. For the turn-direction inference task, ground-truth annotations were manually labeled, and correctness was computed by comparing model judgments with the ground truth. The results are presented in Table 2. We further conducted a qualitative evaluation through manual inspection of reasoning traces.

Turn-direction inference results. We observed a strong bias toward answering "right." Regardless of the actual turning direction, models frequently responded with "right," resulting in accuracy rates mostly around 40–60%. This bias may be related to sycophantic behavior, whereby models tend to produce agreeable or seemingly positive responses. Because "right" often carries an affirmative meaning, the models

	Turn	Missing
API Models		
Gemini-2.5 Flash (Google 2025)	51 (40.80 - 61.14)	68 (57.92 - 76.98)
Gemini-2.0 Flash (Google 2024)	53 (42.76 - 63.06)	12 (6.36 - 20.02)
GPT-5 (OpenAI 2025)	64 (53.79 - 73.36)	92 (84.84-96.48)
GPT-4o (OpenAI 2024)	50 (39.83 - 60.17)	54 (43.74 - 64.02)
Open-source Models		
LLaVA-v1.6-vicuna-13B (Liu et al. 2024a)	37 (27.56 - 47.24)	24 (16.02 - 33.57)
LLaVA-v1.6-vicuna-7B (Liu et al. 2024a)	39 (29.40 - 49.27)	23 (15.17 - 32.49)
LLaVA-v1.6-mistral-7B (Liu et al. 2024a)	39 (29.40 - 49.27)	59 (48.71 - 68.74)
LLaVA-v1.5-7B (Liu et al. 2024b)	48 (37.90 - 58.22)	10 (4.90 - 17.62)
Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct (Bai et al. 2025)	52 (41.78 - 62.10)	52 (41.78 - 62.10)
Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct (Bai et al. 2025)	44 (34.08 - 54.28)	54 (43.74 - 64.02)
Qwen2.5-Omni-7B (Xu et al. 2025a)	52 (41.78 - 62.10)	58 (47.71 - 67.80)
InternVL3-14B (Zhu et al. 2025)	49 (38.86 - 59.20)	67 (56.88 - 76.08)

Table 2: Success rates and 95% confidence interval (%) of the egocentric sequence reasoning task. Turn refers to turn-direction inference, and Missing refers to missing-frame selection.

may have favored it over more neutral alternatives (Sharma et al. 2023; Malmqvist 2025).

Missing-frame selection results. In most cases, model accuracy was close to random, suggesting that the models often failed to grasp the given context and instead fabricated information, which is consistent with hallucination (Huang et al. 2025a; Bai et al. 2024). Although the models occasionally produced correct and contextually consistent answers, their overall reliability remained questionable. Examining the hallucinated cases revealed several distinct patterns. In some instances, the models incorrectly judged continuity, claiming that (b) depicted a later moment in the sequence or that (a) appeared more consistent. In others, they refused to answer altogether. There were also explicit hallucinations, such as inventing nonexistent options like (c) or referring to irrelevant images like (j) as the answer. The results indicate that models fail to properly reference even natural language instructions.

Reasoning under Safety-Relevant Information

Experimental setup. The evaluated models are listed in Table 1, and the prompt used for evaluation is shown in Fig. 2. To measure response consistency, we repeated each experiment 100 times per model using the same prompt. This evaluation consists of two main subtasks. The first is the *Orientation-Tracking*, which evaluates how accurately a model can solve direction-reasoning problems presented in natural language. The second is the *Emergency Evacuation*, which assesses whether a model can make safe choices under emergency conditions. The direction-following task is organized into three difficulty levels: *easy*, *normal*, and *hard*, with the *hard* level containing more complex sentence structures. For the emergency-evacuation task, the *easy* level describes a simple fire emergency in a building, while the *hard* level introduces an additional situational factor: "my important thesis materials are in the lab." This setting was designed to investigate how models behave under added contextual pressure. In addition, the scenario itself never includes a *server room*; this option appears only in the answer choices so that we can examine whether models select an option that is completely unsupported by the context. Both tasks were formulated as multiple-choice questions, and all models were evaluated in a multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) framework.



Figure 5: Response rate of Gemini-2.5 Flash on the hard emergency-evacuation task under reasoning under safety-relevant information.

Critical failure rate. In the emergency-evacuation experiment, the models exhibited alarming behavior when confronted with safety-critical prompts. As shown in Fig. 5, Gemini-2.5 Flash directed users toward the professor's office, where the prompt mentioned important personal materials, in 32% of trials, prioritizing document retrieval over evacuation. This behavior could pose risks if deployed in real-world safety-critical settings. Additionally, in 1% of trials, the model instructed users to head to the server room, a location never mentioned in the prompt. This hallucinated reasoning, which implicitly assumed that important items might be in the server room, may further increase potential risk, as the server room is itself a high-risk area with potential explosion hazards. In contrast, GPT-4o refused to respond to safety-critical prompts, whereas Gemini-2.5 Flash often produced confident yet hazardous responses.

Newer is not always safer. The latest LLMs do not always exhibit superior performance over their predecessors. This was evident in the *hard* level of the emergency-evacuation experiment, where Gemini-2.5 Flash performed 40% worse than Gemini-2.0 Flash. This contrast is notable because it suggests that newer model versions do not necessarily preserve safety-aligned behavior more reliably than earlier ones. This phenomenon can also be observed in Table 2. One possible interpretation is that post-training adaptation or version updates may introduce safety-alignment drift, whereby capabilities or preferences reinforced during later optimization do not consistently preserve previously learned safety-relevant



Figure 6: Representative failure types in the *Back-of-the-Building* task. (a) Structural collapse: Loss of global topology, producing incoherent or missing spatial structures. (b) Directional error: The agent failed to reach the rear of the building. (c) Constraint violation: The path intersected obstacles, yielding unsafe or infeasible planning. (d) Waypoint error: The model failed to place waypoints at directional transition points.

behavior. This interpretation is consistent with prior work showing that downstream fine-tuning can erode safety alignment and that sequential adaptation can induce catastrophic forgetting in large language models (De Lange et al. 2021; Wang et al. 2026; Djuhera et al. 2025; Qi et al. 2023).

Supplementary Experiment: Back-of-the-Building Task

In addition to the tasks shown in Fig. 2, we evaluate directional reasoning in a real-world scene, inspired by (Oh et al. 2015), using an image of a building. This task examines whether the failure patterns observed in earlier experiments also persist when the input is a real visual scene. Each model is given the image and the instruction, *"Navigate the robot to the back-of-the-building,"* and is asked to infer an appropriate navigation direction from the visual and linguistic context. We test multiple prompting strategies, including human prompting, self-prompting, and VoT (Li et al. 2024a; Zhao et al. 2024), to examine the consistency of model behavior under different prompt formulations. This task probes whether the model can interpret a real scene and turn that understanding into a navigation-relevant spatial judgment.

Experimental setup. In this task, we tested three LLMs, namely GPT-4o, Claude Opus 4.1 (Anthropic 2025a), and Claude Sonnet 4 (Anthropic 2025b), each prompted with the identical instruction, "Navigate the robot to the back of the building." The task required inferring the robot's position within the scene, transforming a first-person viewpoint into a top-down layout, and generating a coherent map that links visual perception with spatial reasoning.

Results. The tested models showed limited ability to establish stable spatial correspondences between the visual scene and the generated map. Most produced partially plausible layouts but failed to consistently identify the correct orientation, preserve the structural integrity of the building, or maintain feasible trajectories. As shown in Fig. 6, these results indicate recurring breakdowns in visual–spatial grounding and constraint adherence, revealing instability in high-level spatial reasoning across models.

Discussion

Our findings indicate a clear gap between overall task performance and reliable robotic decision making. Across the tasks we evaluated, models were often competent when spatial structure was explicit and the problem constraints were easy to satisfy, yet this competence did not consistently carry over to settings that required inference from incomplete context, stable visual–spatial grounding, or prioritization of safety under competing cues. In other words, the transition from *solving the task* to *solving it safely and reliably* remains fragile. This gap became evident through qualitatively different forms of model breakdown, including structural collapse in symbolic maps, hallucinated reasoning in sequence and emergency scenarios, violations of explicit movement constraints, and unsafe choices under goal-conflicting prompts. Some newer models also did not behave more safely than earlier ones under the same prompt, suggesting that gains in general capability do not automatically translate into more reliable safety prioritization.

Taken together, these findings support a more cautious framing of current LLM- and VLM-based systems in robotics. In their current form, they are better viewed as assistive reasoning components than as autonomous decision makers.

Future Work

This study provides an initial step toward broader safety evaluation of foundation-model-based robotic decision making. Because our current analysis is built on six diagnostic tasks across three settings, an important next step is to scale the evaluation to a wider range of models, richer navigation inputs, and more diverse safety-critical scenarios. In particular, future work should move beyond task-specific success rates toward more standardized evaluation of safety and reliability, so that failure types such as unsafe choices, constraint violations, and invalid outputs can be compared more systematically and reproducibly across models.

Another important direction is to examine whether the same failure patterns persist in more realistic embodied settings. Our current tasks isolate the decision-making layer under complete spatial information, incomplete spatial information, and safety-relevant prompts, but future studies should test whether these behaviors remain stable in interac-

tive or real-world navigation settings. Such extensions would help clarify when foundation models can be used as reliable assistive planners and what safeguards are required for more robust and adaptive deployment.

Conclusion

We presented a diagnostic evaluation of foundation models for robotic decision making across six tasks spanning three settings: reasoning under complete spatial information, reasoning under incomplete spatial information, and reasoning under safety-relevant information. Across these settings, a consistent pattern emerged: models that perform well on clearly specified tasks can still become unreliable when decisions require grounded spatial inference, consistent adherence to constraints, or safety-first judgment under ambiguity and competing goals. Our findings therefore suggest that the key question is not only whether a model can solve a task, but whether it can support decisions that remain reliable when safety is at stake. These findings highlight the need for failure-centered evaluation before foundation models are deployed in safety-critical robotic systems.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the MSIT (Ministry of Science, ICT), Korea, under the Global Research Support Program in the Digital Field (RS-2024-00426860) and the Artificial Intelligence Convergence Innovation Human Resources Development (IITP-2026-RS-2023-00254592), supervised by the IITP (Institute for Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation). This research was supported in part by NSF IIS-2112633.

References

Anderson, P.; Wu, Q.; Teney, D.; Bruce, J.; Johnson, M.; Sünderhauf, N.; Reid, I.; Gould, S.; and Van Den Hengel, A. 2018. Vision-and-language navigation: Interpreting visually-grounded navigation instructions in real environments. In *Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition*, 3674–3683.

Anthropic. 2025a. Claude Opus 4.1. https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-opus-4-1. Accessed: 2026-03-27.

Anthropic. 2025b. Introducing Claude 4. https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-4. Accessed: 2026-03-27.

Bai, S.; Chen, K.; Liu, X.; et al. 2025. Qwen2.5-VL Technical Report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.13923*.

Bai, Z.; Wang, P.; Xiao, T.; He, T.; Han, Z.; Zhang, Z.; and Shou, M. Z. 2024. Hallucination of multimodal large language models: A survey. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.18930*.

Brohan, A.; et al. 2023. RT-2: Vision-Language-Action Models Transfer Web Knowledge to Robotic Control. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15818*.

Chen, B.; Xu, Z.; Kirmani, S.; Ichter, B.; Sadigh, D.; Guibas, L.; and Xia, F. 2024. SpatialVLM: Endowing Vision-Language Models with Spatial Reasoning Capabilities. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)*, 14455–14465.

Cheng, A.-C.; Yin, H.; Fu, Y.; Guo, Q.; Yang, R.; Kautz, J.; Wang, X.; and Liu, S. 2024. SpatialRGPT: Grounded Spatial Reasoning in Vision-Language Models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*.

De Lange, M.; Aljundi, R.; Masana, M.; Parisot, S.; Jia, X.; Leonardis, A.; Slabaugh, G.; and Tuytelaars, T. 2021. A continual learning survey: Defying forgetting in classification tasks. *IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence*, 44(7): 3366–3385.

Djuhera, A.; Kadhe, S. R.; Ahmed, F.; Zawad, S.; and Boche, H. 2025. SafeMERGE: Preserving safety alignment in fine-tuned large language models via selective layer-wise model merging. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.17239*.

Du, M.; Wu, B.; Li, Z.; Huang, X.; and Wei, Z. 2024. EmbSpatial-Bench: Benchmarking Spatial Understanding for Embodied Tasks with Large Vision-Language Models. In *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers)*, 346–355. Bangkok, Thailand: Association for Computational Linguistics.

Google. 2024. Introducing Gemini 2.0: our new AI model for the agentic era.

Google. 2025. Gemini 2.5 Flash.

Grattafiori, A.; Dubey, A.; Jauhri, A.; et al. 2024. The Llama 3 Herd of Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783*.

Huang, L.; Yu, W.; Ma, W.; Zhong, W.; Feng, Z.; Wang, H.; Chen, Q.; Peng, W.; Feng, X.; Qin, B.; et al. 2025a. A survey on hallucination in large language models: Principles, taxonomy, challenges, and open questions. *ACM Transactions on Information Systems*, 43(2): 1–55.

Huang, Y.; Ding, L.; Tang, Z.; Wang, T.; Lin, X.; Zhang, W.; Ma, M.; and Zhang, Y. 2025b. A Framework for Benchmarking and Aligning Task-Planning Safety in LLM-Based Embodied Agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.14650*.

Ilharco, G.; Jain, V.; Ku, A.; Ie, E.; and Baldridge, J. 2019. General evaluation for instruction conditioned navigation using dynamic time warping. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.05446*.

Krantz, J.; Wijmans, E.; Majumdar, A.; Batra, D.; and Lee, S. 2020. Beyond the nav-graph: Vision-and-language navigation in continuous environments. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, 104–120. Springer.

Ku, A.; Anderson, P.; Patel, R.; Ie, E.; and Baldridge, J. 2020. Room-across-room: Multilingual vision-and-language navigation with dense spatiotemporal grounding. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.07954*.

Kuang, Y.; Lin, H.; and Jiang, M. 2024. Openfmnav: Towards open-set zero-shot object navigation via vision-language foundation models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.10670*.

Li, J.; Wang, J.; Zhang, Z.; and Zhao, H. 2024a. Self-Prompting Large Language Models for Zero-Shot Open-Domain QA. arXiv:2212.08635.

Li, X.; Chen, H.; Sun, Y.; et al. 2024b. PLUGH: A Benchmark for Spatial Understanding and Reasoning in Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.04648*.

Liang, P.; Bommasani, R.; Lee, T.; Tsipras, D.; Soylu, D.; Yasunaga, M.; Zhang, Y.; Narayanan, D.; Wu, Y.; Kumar, A.;

et al. 2022a. Holistic evaluation of language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.09110*.

Liang, V. W.; Zhang, Y.; Kwon, Y.; Yeung, S.; and Zou, J. Y. 2022b. Mind the gap: Understanding the modality gap in multi-modal contrastive representation learning. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 35: 17612–17625.

Liao, A.; et al. 2024. Q-Spatial Bench: Benchmarking and Prompting for Spatial Reasoning. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP)*.

Liu, H.; Li, C.; Li, Y.; Li, B.; Zhang, Y.; Shen, S.; and Lee, Y. J. 2024a. LLaVA-NeXT: Improved reasoning, OCR, and world knowledge.

Liu, H.; Li, C.; Wu, Q.; and Lee, Y. J. 2024b. Improved Baselines with Visual Instruction Tuning. In *CVPR*.

Lu, X.; Chen, Z.; Hu, X.; Zhou, Y.; Zhang, W.; Liu, D.; Sheng, L.; and Shao, J. 2025. IS-Bench: Evaluating Interactive Safety of VLM-Driven Embodied Agents in Daily Household Tasks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.16402*.

Malmqvist, L. 2025. Sycophancy in large language models: Causes and mitigations. In *Intelligent Computing-Proceedings of the Computing Conference*, 61–74. Springer.

Oh, J.; Suppé, A.; Duvallet, F.; Boularias, A.; Navarro-Serment, L.; Hebert, M.; Stentz, A.; Vinokurov, J.; Romero, O.; Lebiere, C.; et al. 2015. Toward mobile robots reasoning like humans. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 29.

OpenAI. 2024. Hello GPT-4o.

OpenAI. 2025. Introducing GPT-5.

Pan, B.; Panda, R.; Jin, S.; Feris, R.; Oliva, A.; Isola, P.; and Kim, Y. 2023. Langnav: Language as a perceptual representation for navigation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.07889*.

Qi, X.; Zeng, Y.; Xie, T.; Chen, P.-Y.; Jia, R.; Mittal, P.; and Henderson, P. 2023. Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to! *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.03693*.

Sharma, M.; Tong, M.; Korbak, T.; Duvenaud, D.; Askell, A.; Bowman, S. R.; Cheng, N.; Durmus, E.; Hatfield-Dodds, Z.; Johnston, S. R.; et al. 2023. Towards understanding sycophancy in language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.13548*.

Turpin, M.; Michael, J.; Perez, E.; and Bowman, S. R. 2023. Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Prompting. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.04388*.

Wang, G.; Shi, H.; Ouyang, T.; and Wang, A. 2026. Few Tokens, Big Leverage: Preserving Safety Alignment by Constraining Safety Tokens during Fine-tuning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2603.07445*.

Wang, J.; Liu, S.; Chen, X.; et al. 2024. Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Delving Into Spatial Reasoning for Vision-Language Models. In *NeurIPS 2024 Workshop on Multimodal Reasoning*.

Xu, J.; Guo, Z.; He, J.; et al. 2025a. Qwen2.5-Omni Technical Report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.20215*.

Xu, L.; Zhao, S.; Lin, Q.; Chen, L.; Luo, Q.; Wu, S.; Ye, X.; Feng, H.; and Du, Z. 2025b. Evaluating Large Language Models on Spatial Tasks: A Multi-Task Benchmarking Study. arXiv:2408.14438.

Yang, A.; Fu, C.; Jia, Q.; Dong, W.; Ma, M.; Chen, H.; Yang, F.; and Wu, H. 2025a. Evaluating and enhancing spatial cognition abilities of large language models. *International Journal of Geographical Information Science*, 1–36.

Yang, J.; Yang, S.; Gupta, A. W.; Han, R.; Fei-Fei, L.; and Xie, S. 2025b. Thinking in Space: How Multimodal Large Language Models See, Remember, and Recall Spaces. arXiv:2412.14171.

Yang, R.; Chen, H.; Zhang, J.; Zhao, M.; Qian, C.; Wang, K.; Wang, Q.; Koripella, T. V.; Movahedi, M.; Li, M.; Ji, H.; Zhang, H.; and Zhang, T. 2025c. EmbodiedBench: Comprehensive Benchmarking Multi-modal Large Language Models for Vision-Driven Embodied Agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.09560*.

Yi, L.; Douady, R.; and Chen, C. 2025. Decipher the Modality Gap in Multimodal Contrastive Learning: From Convergent Representations to Pairwise Alignment. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.03268*.

Yin, S.; Pang, X.; Ding, Y.; Chen, M.; Bi, Y.; Xiong, Y.; Huang, W.; Xiang, Z.; Shao, J.; and Chen, S. 2024. SafeAgentBench: A Benchmark for Safe Task Planning of Embodied LLM Agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.13178*.

Zhang, J.; Wang, K.; Xu, R.; Zhou, G.; Hong, Y.; Fang, X.; Wu, Q.; Zhang, Z.; and Wang, H. 2024. Navid: Video-based vlm plans the next step for vision-and-language navigation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.15852*.

Zhang, Y.; Liu, C.; Zhao, Y.; et al. 2025. PlanQA: A Benchmark for Spatial Reasoning in Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.07644*.

Zhao, X.; Xu, T.; Chen, Y.; et al. 2024. Mind's Eye of LLMs: Visualization-of-Thought Elicits Spatial Reasoning. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*.

Zhu, J.; Wang, W.; Chen, Z.; et al. 2025. InternVL3: Exploring Advanced Training and Test-Time Recipes for Open-Source Multimodal Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.10479*.