Blameworthiness in Security Games

Authors

  • Pavel Naumov Tulane University
  • Jia Tao Lafayette College

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i03.5685

Abstract

Security games are an example of a successful real-world application of game theory. The paper defines blameworthiness of the defender and the attacker in security games using the principle of alternative possibilities and provides a sound and complete logical system for reasoning about blameworthiness in such games. Two of the axioms of this system capture the asymmetry of information in security games.

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Published

2020-04-03

How to Cite

Naumov, P., & Tao, J. (2020). Blameworthiness in Security Games. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 34(03), 2934-2941. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i03.5685

Issue

Section

AAAI Technical Track: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning